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Abstract 
This paper tries to examine in detail political stability in the European Union’s (EU) countries during the period 
2002-12. Firstly, it examines the causality relationship between political stability and economic growth, which is an 
issue that has puzzled scholars for decades. Using the Granger causality test the empirical findings suggest that in the 
case of the EU’s countries, causality is one directional, moving from political stability to economic growth. Secondly, 
it examines the factors that affect political stability. Using the fixed effects panel data model, we may suggest that the 
long term recession, the increased unemployment ratios and the high levels of inflation significantly threaten political 
stability. However, there are other factors that are not exclusively due to economics, such as transparency, public 
health care, education etc., which may significantly reduce the previously mentioned consequences.  Finally, this 
study suggests some reforms of the EU’s regulation according to the migration policy that may smooth social and 
humanitarian disparities.    
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1. Introduction 
On September 15, 2008 Lehman Brothers officially files for bankruptcy. The firm’s total assets are more than $600 
billion. The consequences of the largest filing for bankruptcy in US history led to a financial crisis, which could not 
be limited only to the US economy. In the globalized economic environment the impact of the crisis in the world’s 
largest economy sooner or later spreads all over the world. In the European Union’s (EU) countries the first crisis 
signs emerged after 2008. However, during the following years, the crisis reveals not only economic structural 
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problems (e.g.  GDP Debt and the public deficit threshold violation in the Eurozone’s countries), but also governance 
issues (Vasileiou, 2014 a,b). These problems lead to several demonstrations and government changes in the EU (such 
as in Greece, Italy and Spain). Political stability in the EU is threatened and this kind of atmosphere may lead to 
recession or/and to deeper crisis. In this way the politico-economic environment may start spiraling into a cycle of 
negative results.   
The relationship between economic growth (EG) and political stability (PS) has puzzled economists for decades; 
therefore there is a vast amount of literature on the subject. Most studies suggest that they have a negative 
relationship  (Alesina et al, 1996; Perotti, 1996). There are several theoretical explanations which establish this 
relationship. Blanco and Grier (2009) state that political instability influences investors’ decisions for new capital 
projects until  stability is restored, because investments in physical capital are not easily reversed. Alesina et al (1996) 
assume that  political instability may reduce investment and the speed of  economic development. However, this 
relationship may be bidirectional because poor economic performance may lead to government collapse and political 
unrest. 
This study tries to reach useful conclusions regarding the EU’s political environment using data for the period 2002-
12.  According to the methodology, several panel data models (pooled, fixed and random) are applied. The results are 
similar in all cases, but the econometric analysis suggests that the fixed effects model is the most appropriate for the 
specific sample. Based on these empirical findings, this study suggests some policy implications that may smooth the 
financial crisis’ consequences.   
At this point, we deem that it is necessary to present some data that may prove useful to the rest of the analysis. Ιn 
particular, Table 1 presents: (i) the sample’s countries , (ii) the year of each country's entry into the  EU, (iii) the year  
of the Euro's circulation as the official currency (if the specific country is a member of the European Monetary Union 
(EMU)), (iv) the constant GDP growth indicators, and (v) the public debt ratios. This data shows us that until 2008  
most countries record economic growth, but in 2008 the first signs of  recession appear and in 2009 all the EU’s 
countries (except Poland) fall into a recession. Moreover, in some EU countries the public debt ratios increase 
significantly. The increased public debt and the shrinking GDP increase the sovereign risk in the EU. The case of the 
well-known PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain) emerges in 2010 and it worries the EU authorities for 
a possible contagion effectii.   
This study contributes to international literature by: (i) examining the causality between political stability and 
economic growth for EU countries, (ii) indicating factors that are not exclusively financial, but influence  political 
stability in EU countries, and (iii) suggesting some policy implications that could reduce the financial crisis’ 
consequences. Moreover, this is the first study for political stability in the EU during the Euro era and after the global 
crisis, to the best of our knowledge.    
The rest of this paper is as follows: in section 2 we examine the causality test between economic growth and political 
stability, in section 3 we present the data we used in our sample and the literature background. In section 4 we analyze 
the methodology, in section 5 we present the descriptive statistics and the empirical results. Finally, in section 6 we 
conclude our analysis.      
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Insert Table 1 Here 
 
2. Economic Growth and Political Stability: what is the causality in the EU? 
The political stability - economic growth causality relationship is a long term debate, for which results have not 
suggested a specific direction (Gurgul and Lach, 2012). There are studies which support that: (i) political stability 
influences  economic growth, but the economic growth does not influence  political stability (Alesina et al., 1996), (ii) 
there is only a one way causality that directs from economic growth to political stability (Borner and Paldam, 1998), 
(iii) causality is bi-directional (Gyinmah–Brempong and Traynor, 1999), and (iv) there is no causality between  
economic growth and political stability (Campos and Nugent, 2000). 
In order to run the causality test we should define the political stability and the economic growth indicators. 
Regarding the political stability variable, most of the studies use component indexes. Alonso and Garcimartin (2013) 
analytically present the reasons why the study of institutions faces the limited reliability of the available institutional 
quality indicators. Following their approach we use the Kaufman et al (2010) political stability indicator (PSI)iii in 
order to quantitatively measure the political environment (the higher the PSI values are, the more stable the political 
environment is (and vice versa)). The PSI adequately measures the stability of the political environment, since it is 
calculated by an official-independent organization, with many years of experience, thus we may safely assume that it 
has the necessary expertise. Moreover, this indicator includes all countries in our sample and it is updated yearly, 
making it suitable for this study. According to the economic growth indicator several growth variables are used in the 
literature, but we choose the constant value of GDP like Heo and Tan (2001), because the constant GDP values better 
present the real economic growth rather than the current GDP pricesiv. 
Regarding the following methodology, we use the Granger causality test, which is usually used in these studies, in 
order to draw empirical support if there is a specific direction between political stability and economic growth. 
According to Granger (1969) the variable y  is said to cause x, if x can be predicted with greater accuracy by using 
past values of the y variable rather than not using such past values, all other terms remaining unchanged. 
This procedure can be expressed as following 
 
, where y is the economic growth, x is the political stability term. et and ut are uncorrelated error terms. 
The null hypothesis in this case is that x does not Granger cause y in the first regression and that y does not Granger-
cause x in the second regression. Table 2 presents the F-statistics are the Wald statistics for the joint hypothesis 
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capita growth, and the results are similar to those we mention below (Table 2). These results are available upon request. 
 




Another very important variable in the aforementioned procedure is the lag (l) length. Generally, there is a trade-off in 
the Granger causality procedure: if we include increased lag length, we can draw better and safer conclusions for the 
causality relationship, but the increased lag length reduces the power of this test (Kirchgässner et al., 2013). In order 
to decide the optimal lag order, a number of econometric criteria are suggested (Schwarz, Akaike, LR test and Final 
Prediction Error). For the specific sample the optimal lag length is 6, because: (i) when we increase the number of 
lags by one order the causality remains the same, and (ii)  most econometric criteria agree that the optimal number of 
lag length order is 6 v. 
Table 2 presents the causality relationship between the Economic Growth and Political Stability. The results suggest 
that within the EU countries the Granger causality runs one way from political stability to GDP Growth. Therefore, 
the examination of the factors that influence the political environment is very significant, since its findings may 
suggest the right policies, which may strengthen political stability. Successively, the strengthening of political 
stability may be the first step for the EU’s authorities to smooth out the recent financial crisis’ consequences and lead 
the EU to economic growth.     
Insert Table 2 Here 
3. Data and literature background 
In this section we present the independent variables used in our study. In order to establish our model we bring 
together a significant volume of literature and we examine if the factors below influence political stability in EU 
countries. Moreover, we include additional variables that are highly related to the recent economic crisis and the 
sovereign risk, but have never before been mentioned in the literature. We divide our variables into homogeneous 
categories in order to increase the legibility of this study. 
 (i) Political regime and governance variables 
A relationship that is usually examined in such studies is the political regime (democracy or autocracy) and political 
stability relationship. International literature generally suggests that democratic regimes and political stability are 
positively related, since democracy allows its citizens to participate in the political process and this reduces the 
probability of conflicts (e.g. Rummel, 1995; Parsa, 2003 etc.).   
Since most EU countries are democratic, we should search for some other variables that quantitatively differentiate 
the quality of democracy. In order to achieve this we include in our models variables from Marshall et al (2010) that 
are used in the international literature (e.g. in Goldstone et al, 2010; Blanco and Grier, 2009 etc.) and enable us to 
examine the quality of democracy. In particular, we include the following indicators: (i) democracy, which is a 0 to 
+10 scaled measure of political openness and competitiveness (ii) polity2, which is computed by subtracting the 
autocracy score from the democracy score and it ranges from -10 to +10 (the higher the value the more democratic 
the regime is, and vice versa), (iii) regime durability, which is the number of years since the last substantive change in 
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Only the Schwartz criterion suggests that the optimal length number is 4. All the other criteria suggest that the optimal lag order 
is 6. Whether we choose 4, 5 or 6 lag order, the results remain the same (Table 2). Moreover, the causality results and the order 
remain the same whether we use the constant GDP growth, the current GDP growth or the constant GDP per capita growth. 
These results are available upon request. 
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authority characteristics (defined as a 3-point change in the polity score), and (iv) political competition, which 
measures the degree of institutionalization, or regulation, of political competition, and the extent of government 
restriction on political competition. 
In theory, the higher these values are the more stable the political environment should be. At this point we ought to 
mention that the specific dataset does not include data information for Malta and this does not allow us to use the 
specific variables in all the models of our study. In order to overlook this specific deficiency, we worked out an 
alternative (indirect) way to include the quality of democracy in our models. Rivera-Batiz (2002) presents evidence 
that strong democratic institutions influence governance by constraining the officials’ corrupt behavior. Therefore, we 
may assume that the strong anti-corruption performance is linked to strong democratic regimes (or in other words 
high democratic quality). The positive relationship between democratic quality and anti-corruption performance is 
confirmed in our sample, while the Granger causality test suggests that the corruption causes political stability and 
not the oppositevi. This consequence of previous empirical findings and our sample’s results lead to the assumption 
that the increased transparency should strengthen the political stability. We include the corruprion perception index 
(CPI) in order to test examine if this assumption can be confirmed. We collect our data from the transparency 
international database. The higher the CPI value is, the clearer this country is. Therefore, the CPI’s influence on the 
political stability must be positively correlated.    
Finally, according to the political variables, we try to find empirical evidence of whether participating in the EMU 
influences political stability. For this reason we include the Euro dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if the 
country is an EMU member during the examined year and the value 0 if it is not. There are no recent studies on the 
Euro's influence on political stability (to the best of our knowledge), which suggest a particular influence and cover 
the pre- and post crisis periodvii. 
(ii) Macroeconomic and crisis variables 
In section 2 we point out that in the EU the relationship between political stability and economic growth is one way 
and runs from the political stability to economic growth. This study’s objective is the financial crisis influence on the 
political stability and whether there is a way to avoid political instability. Therefore, as a part of our study we include 
the long term recession, rather than economic growth in order to examine its influence on political stability. Our 
assumption is that a short term recession is part of an economic cycle, so citizens may tolerate it for one or two years 
without influencing the political environment. But what happens when the recession lasts for more than two years? 
Theoretically, the long term recession may cause political instability for several reasons, such as increased poverty 
ratios, doubts about the political leadership abilities, a public desire for change etc. For this reason we do not use a 
GDP growth indicator, but we include in our regressions a long term recession dummy variable, which sums the 
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Fratzscher and Stracca (2009) in a very interesting (pre-crisis) paper conclude that EMU reduces the impact of the political 
shocks in each member’s political environment, but transfers these influences into the Eurozone. Moreover, EMU may reduce the 
political market discipline. These conclusions are similar to those noted in Vasileiou, 2014a,b. Below we define the pre- and the 
post crisis years. 
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consecutive negative GDP growth years (for example, if we have one negative GDP growth year X we use 1, if the  
year after is also negative that  year's X+1 dummy is 2 etc.). 
Another crucial macroeconomic variable that is linked to economic performance is  income. When income is high 
and/or increased, the opportunity cost for an individual to protest or revolt is high, too. In this case his (or her) 
decision to take part in protests and insurrections is a high cost, therefore the incentives to cease their participation in 
productive activities are reduced (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). In our analysis we include the GDP per capita in US 
dollars in order to: (i) examine how the average income influences political stability, and (ii) avoid the currency 
differences across/amongst the EU countries.   
The unemployment ratio is a macroeconomic variable that is often included in political stability studies and it is 
positively correlated to political stability. This may be indirectly linked to the significant lower opportunity cost that 
the unemployed population has. The unemployment issue greatly puzzles the EU since the crisis peaked. There is a 
common opinion that Europe is being tested not only by the sovereign debt, but also whether it can avoid issues 
rooted in unemployment (Friedman, 2013). The unemployment crisis leads to a political crisis, and this political crisis 
may undermine all of the institutions Europe has worked so hard to create. In order to examine in detail the 
unemployment’s influence on the political stability from different points of view, apart from the general 
unemployment ratio we further examine: (i)  long term unemployment, (ii)  youth unemployment, and (iii) the ratio of 
the population aged 18-59 who are living in households where no-one works to the total population (jobless 
households). 
Inflation is another macroeconomic variable that is usually included in political instability studies. Inflation and 
political stability are negatively correlated, because the fear of replacement or change may influence the new 
cabinet’s decisions regarding the levels of inflation and unemployment (Aisen and Veiga, 2013). Generally, the 
frequent cabinet changes may indicate not only that the political environment is unstable, but also that the economic 
policy varies through the years. 
Other parts of the economic policy are the decisions made according to the public budget deficit/surplus and public 
debt. Empirical studies suggest that higher government consumption reduces the risk of losing office, therefore 
reducing political instability (Annet, 2001).  Politicians fearing cabinet changes may increase government 
consumption (or lower the taxes) by increasing the public debt in their attempt to curry favor with the voter and to 
remain in power. During “normal times”viii these policies may not significantly influence the country’s sovereign risk, 
but during a crisis the consequences of these policies should be resolved by the next governments. The European 
Financial Aid implies fiscal adjustment and austerity measures, which may lead to political instability (e.g. the Greek 
case). For these reasons in our analysis we use specific interactions of the aforementioned indexes and the EU’s crisis 
years. Particularly, the global economic crisis bursts in 2007, the consequences are obviously seen in Europe during 
2008; however in 2010 the sovereign risk crisis starts (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain and Hungary are some 
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of the countries which face such issues during this periodix).  Therefore, in our models: (i) we assume that the crisis 
begins in 2010, and (ii) we include the deficit and the public debt ratios, for which we examine their influence 
depending on the time period. We divide the time in pre- and post crisis period, because in economics the same ratios 
in growth times may be characterized as normal ratios, but during the crisis period may be characterized as an 
indicator which is extremely dangerous for economic stability. 
(iii) Income Inequality, Socioeconomic and Demographic influences 
There are several socioeconomic factors that may influence the political environment, regardless of the country’s 
economic performance. A factor that significantly influences political stability is the distribution of income. In  
international literature the negative relationship between income inequalities and political stability is well-established 
(Alesina and Perotti, 1994; Perotti, 1996). In order to include the income inequality we use the Gini coefficient, which 
is the measure that is generally used in the respective literature. Theoretically, increased income inequalities (Gini 
coefficient) should reduce political stability. Furthermore, we include the poverty risk and the poverty threshold 
indexes as supplementary inequality indicators, because these indexes may present how severe the social conditions 
may be in some countries. Moreover, people that are in poverty do not have much to lose; therefore their participation 
in protests has an extremely low opportunity risk.  
Another variable we include in our model is the urban to the total population indicator (urban). In contrast to the 
income inequality’s variable, the urban’s influence on political stability is not well established in the literature.  
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) suggest that the more urbanized a country is, the operational capability of a government 
to suppress possible protests is increased; therefore the more stable the political environment should be. In contrast, 
Auvinen (1997) and Annett (2000) suggest that this relationship is negative, because the more populated the cities are, 
the more difficult it is for a government to provide good quality and adequate public services. The low quality of 
public services causes public discontent, which may lead to political instability. Therefore, this study may add further 
empirical evidence in the doubtful relationship between political stability and urbanization. 
Empirical literature suggests that education significantly influences the political environment in at least two ways: (i) 
public education tends to produce a more even income distribution (Saint-Paul and Verdier, 1993), and (ii) the more 
educated the people are, the more productive they should be and in this (indirect) way education contributes to  
economic growth and the economic growth to political stability (Miljkovic and Rimalb, 2008). However, by 
examining the literature we see that there is a disagreement on which level of education should be used as an 
indicator. In particular, Alesina and Perotti (1996) use the primary school enrollment and Miljkovic and Rimalb 
(2008) use the secondary school enrollment. The latter suggest that the initial primary school-enrollment may be 
appropriate in undeveloped nations, but for developed countries, as most of the EU countries are, the threshold should 
be raised, because in these countries people with primary education do not contribute significantly to economic 
growth and to political stability. That is the main reason why in our study we use secondary school enrollment as an 
education indicator. 
                                                             
ixA point of reference may be the official request of the Greek authorities for entrance in the European Stability Mechanism in 
2010. For an extensive report see European Commission (2009) and Vasileiou (2014 a,b). 
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Other than education, health is another significant factor of the social policy that may influence the political 
environment. Health is the most significant asset in peoples’ lives and the poor quality health services may lead to 
political instability. Public health, like public education, may be a way of income redistribution. That is why we 
choose to include the public health expenditures index in our models. 
Health sector issues may be linked to many other economic and demographic factors. Aging is a factor that is usually 
included in political studies. Older people present a higher turnout to the elections; therefore the increased average 
age of a society should lead to increased participation in the election procedures (Goerres, 2007). As we mention 
above, the increased participation in the political process reduces the possibility for conflicts; therefore the population 
aging may tend to produce more political stability. Furthermore, aging may influence political stability not only 
directly, but also indirectly. As we mention before, high quality public health care tends to produce a more even 
income distribution in aging countries. Cecchetti et al (2011) provides a very interesting view of how the sovereign 
risk and the public budget deficits link to the public health expenditures and the population aging in EU countries 
(Spain, Italy, Greece etc.).  Therefore, we include the age group 0-19 to the total population ratio and the median 
population in order to examine their influence in political stability.   
(iv) Neighborhood Instability 
 “Bad neighboring” could be a crucial factor for the political stability. Blanco and Grier (2009) briefly and clearly 
summarize the respective literature according to which countries in “bad neighborhoods” might “import” a part of the 
neighboring instability, when a flood of refugees enters the country. Most EU countries, especially northern and 
central European countries, do not suffer from “bad neighboring” problems. However, in the past years in Europe 
there has been a significant flood of refugees from African and Asian countries (Afghanistan, Egypt, Pakistan, Syria 
etc.), which have recently suffered from wars and rebellions. For these people, the Southern European countries are 
the first countries on their way to Europe. 
However, even if the refugees’ desired destination is not South Europe, in most cases they are forced to stay in these 
countries due to the EU’s legislation. In particular, the European Council Regulation (2003), or widely known as 
“Dublin II”, establishes the criteria and mechanisms for determining the EU’s Member State responsible for 
examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national.  In the 10th article it 
mentions that “Where it is established, on the basis of proof or circumstantial evidence, that an asylum seeker has 
irregularly crossed the border into a Member State by land, sea or air having come from a third country, the Member 
State thus entered shall be responsible for examining the application for asylum. This responsibility shall cease 12 
months after the date on which the irregular border crossing took place”. This regulation automatically increases the 
possibility of the countries that are on he EU’s south borders to examine the asylum application, even if the refugees’ 
final destination it not one of themx. In order to study the specific issue we include two variables in our regressions: 
(i) the Euroborder variable, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a country is an EU border in general 
(and 0 otherwise), and (ii) the South Europe variable, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the specific 
country is on the south border of the EU (and 0 otherwise). If only the second variable is statistically significant this 
                                                             
x
In this point we should mention that in the last years the some of the Southern EU’s countries suffer from the financial crisis and 
the increased refugees’ number makes the politico-economic environment in these countries even harder. Such an environment 
may be ideal for the rise of the far right parties, which is an issue that concerns the EU’s authorities (Palmer, 2013). 
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may be an indication that the EU’s southern borders are influenced by “neighborhood instability” and that the “Dublin 
II” legislation should be revised. 
 4. Methodological Issues 
There are several panel data methodologies (pooled, fixed or random effects) we may use in order to empirically 
examine the determinants of the political stability in the EU. Many researchers (Blanco and Grier, 2009; Saidem et 
al., 2002 etc.) apply the pooled regression panel data, which implies that the sample is a priori homogenous, therefore 
the cross section estimations are the same. The alternative to the pooled regression methodology may be either the 
fixed effect or the random effect modeling. The fixed effects method allows us for different constants in each country, 
which means that in our case each country starts from a different point-level of political stability. This “starting point” 
is influenced from variables that do not vary over time, therefore in the fixed effects model we cannot include 
variables that are constant (Appendix B). On the other hand, the random effect model handles the “starting point” for 
each country not as fixed, but as a random variable. 
Apart from the theoretical implications and the possible suggestions of which of these models may be more 
appropriate in a sample, econometrics enables us to choose the most appropriate model using quantitative methods. 
The standard F-test can be used to check fixed effects against the pooled regression. In this case the null hypothesis is 
that all the constants are the same, therefore we must use the pooled regression. 
In our study we reject the null hypothesis because F>FN-1, NT-N-K, 
, where 
 
R2= the coefficient of determination of the fixed and the random effect respectively, N= cross section dimension, 
T=time period and K=independent variables, therefore we should use the Fixed effects method. 
The other test we should run is the Hausman test, which helps us to choose the most appropriate approach between 
the fixed and random effects. The null hypothesis is that the random effects are consistent and efficient; under the null 
hypothesis that random effects are inconsistent (the fixed effects will be always consistent). The Hausman test uses 
the following test statistic: 
 
If H>χ2(k) we should use the fixed effects model, otherwise we should use the random effects. 
In our study the aforementioned tests, which are available upon request, suggest that the fixed effect is the most 
appropriate methodological approach for our sample. We assume that μi as encapsulates all of the variables that affect 
yi,t cross-sectionally, but does not vary over time, therefore our model is 
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,where xit=the vector of the independent variables we include in our model, D1i is a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 for all observations on the first country (Austria) in the sample and zero otherwise, D2i is a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 for all observations on the second entity (Belgium) and zero otherwise, and so on (the countries 
in the dataset are inserted in alphabetical order). 
 
5. Descriptive statistics, empirical results presentation and analysis 
This study includes a significant number of variables, which cannot be included in a single regressionxi, because 
either the data does not cover each variable in the whole panel or in some cases multicolinearity issues emerge. These 
issues force us to use several regressions in order to reach useful conclusions (in each case under the specific 
assumptions we present below). Tables 3 and 4 respectively present the mean values and the correlation matrix of the 
variables we mainly use in our study. We do not present the descriptive statistics for the whole set of the variables in 
order to save space. In any case the data which is not included in Tables 3 and 4 are available upon request.   
Insert Table 3 & 4 Here 
Table 5 presents the empirical results of our “core” model. The results suggest the following. Firstly, countries that 
adequately fight corruption increase their political stability performance (as expected). Secondly, the increased 
income level does not ensure political stability, because even if the coefficient is positive (as expected) it is not 
statistically significant. Thirdly, the findings for all the unemployment ratios we examine (unemployment, long term 
unemployment, youth unemployment and jobless households) suggest that increased unemployment reduces in a 
statistically significant way the political stability. Fourthly, inflation has the same influence to political stability as 
unemployment; therefore increased inflation may contribute to political instability. 
Fifthly, according to the public budget variable the results suggest that during the pre-crisis period (before 2010) the 
public budget surplus countries are politically more stable than the deficit ones. However, post-crisis (after 2010)  
even the positive public budgets do not contribute to the strengthening of political stability. This means that during 
the growth years the political stability in rationally budgeted countries is increased; however during the recession 
years even correct handling of public finance may not be adequate. An alternative explanation may be that when there 
is increased international liquidity (before 2010), politicans in politically unstable countries, in order to gain 
governance, may implement a pro-people policy by increasing the public debt, which may be a problem for the future 
generations/governments. Regarding the public debt ratio, the empirical findings do not indicate that public debt 
influences in a statistically significant way the political stability (model 3). If we combine these results we may 
assume that the increased public debt does not influence political stability in a country, if this country is capable of 
meeting its obligations without asking for external financing (e.g. countries under memorandum)..   
Sixthly, the population aging strengthens the political stability. We draw the same conclusions if we replace the 
median population with the age group 0-19 population’s ratio. Possible explanations may be either that older people 
                                                             
xi
Appendix A presents all the indicators that are examined in this study, their definitions and their sources. An additional model 
which examines the fractionalization’s influence on the political stability is presented in the Appendix B. The reason why this 
model is presented in the Appendix is that the fractionalization variables are usually included in political stability studies, but the 
lack of time series data and the fixed effects modelling do not allows to examine it in all the regressions. 
 
Vasileiou /International Journal of Research in Business and Social Science Vol 3, No 1, 2014 ISSN: 2147-4478 
153 
 
tend to participate in the election process more that younger people and this participation reduces the political 
conflicts or that political instability actions arise from younger peoplexii. 
Seventhly, the long term dummy recession negatively influences political stability within the EU. In the EU most 
countries had at least one recession year in our sample’s period. If the recession years are consecutively more than 
one, this reduces the population’s tolerance against potential austerity measures. The Greek case may be a 
representative example. 
Eighthly, regarding the “bad neighboring”, the empirical findings confirm our assumptions that the “Dublin II” may 
increase political instability in the southern EU counties via immigrants which want to reach Europe and in most   
cases pass through these countries, but the “Dublin II” legislation forces them to stay in there. That is why the EU 
border variable does not have increased statistical significance, but the south border variable does. 
Ninthly, we try to include in our study another view of political stability in EUcountries. The Euro coefficient is 
negative, but statistically not significant; therefore we do not have sufficient evidence that EMU membership reduces  
political stabilityxiii. However, we may certainly assume that the EMU does not increase the political stability. 
The aforementioned results are the core empirical findings which almost fully cover the dataset. We examine several 
other models in order to draw conclusions for other factors that may influence political stability and they do not cover 
the whole data set.  In model 5 we include the health expenditure and the secondary school enrollment (the 2012 data 
for each country are not included in the dataset). In order to avoid multicolinearity problems we remove the median 
population from the regression. The results suggest that both variables may contribute to the stabilization of the 
political environment, because: (i) increased public participation in health expenditures tends to produce a more even 
income distribution, and (ii) secondary school enrollment is an indicator for better educated people, which tend to be 
more productive and promote economic growth that may lead to a more stable political environment.   
In most of the models we do not include the Gini coefficient due to the lack of a complete dataset. However, most 
political stability studies include the specific variable and this fact “forces” us to try to find a way to present the 
income inequality’s influence on political stability. We assume that the Gini coefficient values for the  unavailable 
data are the same as the last mentioned. The results are presented in model 2 and they suggest (as expected), that 
increased inequalities in income distribution lead to a political instabilityxiv. 
Finally, we examine how the political regime influences political stability. The political stability’s dataset does not 
include Malta. The results suggest that democracy, polity2, regime durability and political competition do not strongly 
influence political stability. These results are available upon request. 
                                                             
xiiThe population ageing ratio apart from the demographic interpretation is linked to the public health policy, as we present below. 
 
xiiiIn models 1-3 we present the Euro variable, but in the models 3-6 we exclude it in order to avoid multicolinearity issues due to 
the South Europe dummy variable. 
 
xivThe lack of the complete Gini dataset does not enable us to take as granted that our assumption is correct.  Among the variables 
we use and may be closer to the Gini coefficient are the poverty risk and the poverty risk threshold, but the empirical findings did 
not show a statistically significant influence of these indicators to the political instability, therefore we do not present these results. 
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Insert Table 5 & 6 Here 
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
The main objective of our research is to examine in detail the determinants of political stability in the EU’s countries 
during the 2002-12 period. We test the political stability-economic growth Granger causality and the results suggest 
that political stability causes economic growth, whilst the opposite does not hold for the EU’s case. We try to gather 
as many variables that are usually used in the international empirical literature and to include some other variables 
that may fit to the EU’s case. As in the most studies, our results suggest that economic growth is positively related to 
political stability. The recent economic crisis threatens the economic stability in EU economies especially in those 
countries that suffer from long term recession. The public budget surplus increases political stability for the pre-crisis 
period (before 2010), but during the post-crisis period these results are not confirmed. The enforcement of austerity 
measures by the governments in order to achieve balanced (or positive) public budgets may explain this change. 
During normal times the governments in countries which suffer from political instability may increase the public debt 
in order to curry favor with the voters, but during the crisis years (after 2010) the difficulties for external financing do 
not enable them to continue these policies.      
Furthermore, the empirical findings show that there are several factors that may enhance political stability and are not 
related exclusively to economic performance. Political decisions, either from each country’s government or the EU’s 
officials may be taken in order to enhance political stability amongst EU countries in the following ways: as the 
results suggest the effective anti-corruption policy may strengthen political stability in a country. Transparency is a 
crucial factor because it spreads the sense of justice in a society. The increased quality public health services may 
secure political stability. Therefore, a government, even during severe economic crisis, should ensure that the 
qualities of public health services are not reduced. Possible explanations for the specific results may be that health is 
the most important asset in human life and that the public health expenditures may be a way for a fairer income 
distribution.  Education may be a crucial factor for the future economic development consequently it should be 
“protected” in order for society to create conditions for a long term growth and for long term political stability. All the 
unemployment ratios strongly threaten political stability and this is a major issue that the EU has to resolve if the 
authorities' are concerned for the common European visionxv. The EU authorities should take initiatives to increase 
the transparency level, and to protect the education and the health sector in member countries in order to consolidate 
the political stability and to avoid a possible contagion effect within the EU. According to the Euro adoption the 
empirical findings suggest that it does not significantly influence the domestic political environment. 
Finally, another factor which threatens political stability, and for which the EU is capable of taking the initiative in 
order to resolve it, is border protection and immigration policy. Countries in the southern EU’s borders are strongly 
influenced probably from the increased immigration population. The long term regression and the flood of 
immigration may be an explanation for the rise of the far right parties in Europe (Palmer, 2013). The EU’s authorities 
should seriously consider these results and revise the austerity measures and the immigration policy in order to 
protect the vision for a United Europe. 
 
                                                             
xvThere are several recent reports that agree with our comments (Terzi, 2013 ; Cechetti et al., 2011); Economist, 2013 etc.) 
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Table 1: Data regarding each country’s entrance year in European Union, the year of the Euro-adoption, the economic performance and the public debt ratios 
during the period 2002-12. 
Country EU EMU 
Gross domestic product, constant prices (Percent change) 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Austria 1995 2002 1.694 0.866 2.590 2.401 3.670 3.706 1.436 -3.822 1.769 2.834 0.871 
Belgium 1952 2002 1.359 0.807 3.274 1.752 2.666 2.883 0.985 -2.787 2.416 1.840 -0.281 
Bulgaria 2007 - 4.650 5.505 6.748 6.358 6.511 6.448 6.191 -5.476 0.393 1.841 0.775 
Cyprus 2004 2008 2.129 1.865 4.233 3.862 4.128 5.093 3.587 -1.857 1.309 0.533 -2.425 
Czech Republic 2004 - 2.149 3.766 4.743 6.752 7.020 5.735 3.099 -4.507 2.469 1.819 -1.235 
Denmark 1973 - 0.466 0.384 2.296 2.445 3.395 1.583 -0.784 -5.666 1.577 1.104 -0.377 
Estonia 2004 2011 7.940 7.765 6.343 8.853 10.097 7.492 -4.151 -14.098 2.565 9.558 3.939 
Finland 1995 - 1.834 2.012 4.126 2.915 4.411 5.335 0.294 -8.539 3.363 2.726 -0.827 
France 1952 2002 0.929 0.899 2.545 1.826 2.467 2.285 -0.081 -3.147 1.725 2.027 0.014 
Germany 1952 2002 0.030 -0.387 0.694 0.846 3.886 3.389 0.807 -5.085 3.857 3.399 0.896 
Greece 1981 2002 3.440 5.944 4.368 2.280 5.511 3.536 -0.214 -3.136 -4.943 -7.105 -6.389 
Hungary 2004 - 4.506 3.850 4.797 3.964 3.894 0.110 0.893 -6.767 1.317 1.646 -1.730 
Ireland 1973 2002 5.417 3.730 4.200 6.080 5.505 4.970 -2.160 -6.384 -1.063 2.169 0.157 
Italy 1952 2002 0.451 -0.047 1.731 0.931 2.199 1.683 -1.156 -5.494 1.723 0.374 -2.369 
Latvia 2004 - 7.224 7.600 8.857 10.123 11.154 9.600 -3.275 -17.729 -0.942 5.477 5.578 
Lithuania 2004 - 6.838 10.276 7.369 7.791 7.809 9.796 2.912 -14.847 1.521 5.866 3.617 
Luxembourg 1952 2002 4.088 1.669 4.376 5.253 4.933 6.588 -0.735 -4.073 2.891 1.656 0.336 
Malta 2004 2008 2.434 0.716 -0.289 3.585 2.580 4.073 3.881 -2.812 3.189 1.819 1.039 
Netherlands 1952 2002 0.076 0.336 2.237 2.046 3.394 3.921 1.804 -3.668 1.528 0.945 -1.247 
Poland 2004 - 1.443 3.867 5.345 3.617 6.227 6.785 5.127 1.628 3.875 4.521 1.865 
Portugal 1986 2002 0.764 -0.911 1.560 0.775 1.448 2.365 -0.009 -2.908 1.936 -1.288 -3.238 
Romania 2007 - 5.077 5.237 8.490 4.154 7.875 6.317 7.349 -6.576 -1.149 2.158 0.689 
Slovakia 2004 2009 4.583 4.775 5.058 6.655 8.346 10.494 5.751 -4.936 4.382 3.226 2.027 
Slovenia 2004 2007 3.827 2.930 4.402 4.007 5.850 6.960 3.383 -7.943 1.258 0.709 -2.543 
Spain 1986 2002 2.707 3.088 3.257 3.588 4.075 3.479 0.893 -3.832 -0.203 0.052 -1.643 
Sweden 1995 - 2.483 2.336 4.235 3.161 4.297 3.314 -0.613 -5.028 6.557 2.933 0.954 
United Kingdom 1973 - 2.295 3.949 3.173 3.235 2.755 3.427 -0.769 -5.170 1.660 1.117 0.170 
Continued 
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Country EU EMU 
Public Debt to GDP (%) 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Austria 1995 2002 66,2 65,3 64,7 64,2 62,3 60,2 63,8 69,2 72,3 72,8 74 
Belgium 1952 2002 103,4 98,4 94 92 87,9 84 89,2 95,7 95,7 98 99,8 
Bulgaria 2007 - 52,4 44,4 37 27,5 21,6 17,2 13,7 14,6 16,2 16,3 18,5 
Cyprus 2004 2008 65,1 69,7 70,9 69,4 64,7 58,8 48,9 58,5 61,3 71,5 86,6 
Czech Republic 2004 - 27,1 28,6 28,9 28,4 28,3 27,9 28,7 34,6 38,4 41,4 46,2 
Denmark 1973 - 49,5 47,2 45,1 37,8 32,1 27,1 33,4 40,7 42,7 46,4 45,4 
Estonia 2004 2011 5,7 5,6 5 4,6 4,4 3,7 4,5 7,1 6,7 6,1 9,8 
Finland 1995 - 41,5 44,5 44,4 41,7 39,6 35,2 33,9 43,5 48,7 49,2 53,6 
France 1952 2002 58,8 62,9 64,9 66,4 63,7 64,2 68,2 79,2 82,4 85,8 90,2 
Germany 1952 2002 60,7 64,4 66,2 68,6 68 65,2 66,8 74,5 82,5 80 81 
Greece 1981 2002 101,7 97,4 98,6 100 106,1 107,4 112,9 129,7 148,3 170,3 156,9 
Hungary 2004 - 55,9 58,6 59,5 61,7 65,9 67 73 79,8 82,2 82,1 79,8 
Ireland 1973 2002 31,8 31 29,4 27,2 24,6 24,9 44,2 64,4 91,2 104,1 117,4 
Italy 1952 2002 105,4 104,1 103,7 105,7 106,3 103,3 106,1 116,4 119,3 120,7 127 
Latvia 2004 - 13,6 14,7 15 12,5 10,7 9 19,8 36,9 44,4 41,9 40,6 
Lithuania 2004 - 22,2 21 19,3 18,3 17,9 16,8 15,5 29,3 37,8 38,3 40,5 
Luxembourg 1952 2002 6,3 6,2 6,3 6,1 6,7 6,7 14,4 15,5 19,5 18,7 21,7 
Malta 2004 2008 57,9 66 69,8 68 62,5 60,7 60,9 66,5 66,8 69,5 71,3 
Netherlands 1952 2002 50,5 52 52,4 51,8 47,4 45,3 58,5 60,8 63,4 65,7 71,3 
Poland 2004 - 42,2 47,1 45,7 47,1 47,7 45 47,1 50,9 54,9 56,2 55,6 
Portugal 1986 2002 56,8 59,4 61,9 67,7 69,4 68,4 71,7 83,7 94 108,2 124,1 
Romania 2007 - 24,9 21,5 18,7 15,8 12,4 12,8 13,4 23,6 30,5 34,7 37,9 
Slovakia 2004 2009 43,4 42,4 41,5 34,2 30,5 29,6 27,9 35,6 41 43,4 52,4 
Slovenia 2004 2007 27,8 27,2 27,3 26,7 26,4 23,1 22 35,2 38,7 47,1 54,4 
Spain 1986 2002 52,6 48,8 46,3 43,2 39,7 36,3 40,2 54 61,7 70,5 86 
Sweden 1995 - 52,5 51,7 50,3 50,4 45,3 40,2 38,8 42,6 39,4 38,6 38,2 
United Kingdom 1973 - 37,1 38,7 40,3 41,7 42,7 43,7 51,9 67,1 78,4 84,3 88,7 
Sources: Sources: ECB web site, IMF World Economic Outlook Database (October 2013) and Eurostat. 
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Table 2: Political Stability and Economic Growth’s stability test 
 
Null Hypothesis Results 
Political Stability does not Granger cause GDP 















Observations 189 162 135 
Lag length 4 5 6 
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Corruption GDP  per cap $ Gini Unemployment Inflation Urban 
Public 
bugdet 









Austria 1,17 8,02 41.061,43 25,95 4,51 2,04 66,93 -2,29 66,82 40,54 7,93 99,15 
Belgium 0,83 7,32 39.388,93 27,05 7,87 2,22 97,36 -1,86 94,37 40,35 7,46 121,00 
Bulgaria 0,27 3,87 5.049,19 30,78 10,65 5,32 71,26 -0,37 25,40 41,13 4,25 89,53 
Cyprus 0,47 6,03 24.782,26 28,92 5,67 2,62 69,81 -3,49 65,95 35,28 2,89 96,36 
Czech Republic 0,94 4,55 15.600,13 25,13 6,96 2,37 73,62 -3,87 32,59 38,99 6,09 92,95 
Denmark 1,08 9,38 51.338,79 25,30 5,54 2,12 86,24 0,90 40,67 39,82 8,65 121,01 
Estonia 0,65 6,29 12.813,78 33,18 9,98 4,14 69,45 0,57 5,75 39,10 4,26 100,62 
Finland 1,50 9,38 41.046,24 25,90 8,12 1,89 83,16 1,69 43,25 41,20 6,29 113,76 
France 0,52 7,02 37.834,79 28,60 8,81 1,94 82,86 -4,25 71,52 39,08 8,73 111,44 
Germany 0,84 7,90 37.069,03 27,65 8,55 1,72 73,57 -2,24 70,72 42,77 8,41 51,75 
Greece 0,27 4,10 23.425,26 33,61 11,90 3,15 60,73 -8,18 120,85 40,65 6,08 101,68 
Hungary 0,82 5,00 11.615,74 26,56 8,28 5,16 67,48 -5,05 69,59 39,33 5,41 98,36 
Ireland 1,14 7,49 48.114,06 30,47 8,17 1,97 61,06 -6,07 53,65 33,70 6,10 112,53 
Italy 0,47 4,68 32.200,81 31,45 8,14 2,39 67,88 -3,55 110,73 42,21 6,83 99,09 
Latvia 0,58 4,37 10.002,93 35,93 11,98 5,31 67,88 -3,02 23,55 39,73 3,83 96,33 
Lithuania 0,75 4,83 9.893,87 33,59 11,23 3,31 66,87 -3,20 25,17 38,55 4,65 99,94 
Luxembourg 1,42 8,46 91.429,72 27,53 4,49 2,79 84,54 0,71 11,65 38,38 6,59 97,23 
Malta 1,27 5,94 17.625,99 28,03 6,88 2,49 94,01 -4,10 65,45 38,63 5,70 96,67 
Netherlands 0,99 8,80 42.798,63 26,67 3,93 1,97 81,08 -2,28 56,28 39,58 8,22 120,44 
Poland 0,68 4,42 9.923,61 31,60 13,32 2,79 61,24 -4,93 49,05 36,99 4,61 99,27 
Portugal 0,93 6,28 19.548,59 36,18 9,36 2,41 58,71 -5,42 78,66 39,96 6,79 103,20 
Romania 0,19 3,40 6.164,40 33,04 7,53 8,98 52,81 -3,74 22,38 37,15 4,35 89,17 
Slovak Republic 0,90 4,33 12.411,27 25,71 14,45 3,79 55,29 -4,42 38,35 35,96 5,37 89,72 
Slovenia 1,03 6,24 20.486,58 23,10 6,60 3,45 50,26 -3,14 32,35 40,45 6,23 98,80 
Spain -0,10 6,64 27.801,01 32,53 14,26 2,81 76,96 -3,67 52,66 39,16 6,26 118,75 
Sweden 1,23 9,21 44.991,95 23,82 7,10 1,49 84,66 0,75 44,36 40,34 7,54 109,31 
United Kingdom 0,37 8,16 37.988,18 33,45 6,19 2,46 79,23 -5,31 55,87 39,01 7,02 102,28 













GDP per cap 












Political Stability 1 
          
 
Corruption 0,5302 1 
         
 
GDP per cap 
USD 
0,4045 0,7412 1 
        
 
Gini -0,4956 -0,4032 -0,2898 1         
Unemployment -0,4119 -0,4637 -0,4197 0,2516 1 
      
 
Inflation -0,2493 -0,4204 -0,3244 0,1991 -0,0442 1 
     
 
Urban 0,2390 0,5870 0,5035 
-
0,2832 
-0,2473 -0,3115 1 
    
 
Public Budget 0,3155 0,3311 0,2045 -
0,2458 
-0,3720 0,1196 0,3101 1 
   
 
Public Debt -0,1738 0,0059 0,0794 
-




0,2597 0,6501 0,5906 
-
0,3788 -0,2536 -0,4083 0,4356 -0,0427 0,3863 1   
Median 
Population 
-0,0174 0,1953 0,1470 -
0,0760 




0,0976 0,3388 0,2198 -
0,0492 
-0,0878 -0,1820 0,3464 0,0520 0,1241 0,1955 -0,1195 1 
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Table 5: The core political stability findings 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant -0.400689 (0.0000)* -0.408890 (0.0000)* -0.391684 (0.0000)* 
Corruption 0.046626 (0.0055)* 0.048438 (0.0031)* 0.054140 (0.0017)* 
GDP per cap $ 2.70E-06 (0.4039) 3.06E-06 (0.3438) 2.10E-06 (0.5022) 
Gini  -0.008376 (0.0500)**  
Unemployment -0.018188 (0.0060)* -0.018157 (0.0060)* -0.019664 (0.0089)* 
Inflation -0.013289 (0.0022)* -0.013353 (0.0019)* -0.013014 (0.0091)* 
Urban -0.003634 (0.5829) -0.004598 (0.4168) -0.001285 (0.8556) 
Public Budget before 2010 0.007024 (0.0661)*** 0.007095 (0.0627)***  
Public budget after 2010 -0.010159 (0.1319) -0.010226 (0.1314)  
Public Debt before 2010   -0.000967 (0.4884) 
Public Debt after 2010   0.000647 (0.5771) 
Median population 0.043060 (0.0017)* 0.038484 (0.0053)* 0.038655 (0.0056)* 
Long term recession -0.041052 (0.0034)* -0.039325 (0.0032)* -0.041391 (0.0018)* 
EU border -0.039153 (0.4674) -0.045179 (0.4241) -0.044159 (0.4062) 
Euro -0.018219 (0.4101) -0.016872 (0.4575) -0.025027 (0.3352) 
R2 0.827279 0.828973 0.825552 
Durbin Watson 1.90 1.92 1.90 
Observations 294 294 294 
Notes: The signs *,**,*** indicate a level of statistical importance 1%,5% and 10% respectively. Coefficients’ p-values are given in parentheses. 
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Table 6: Further political stability findings 
Variables Model 4 Model 5 
constant -0.415247 (0.0000)* -0.381879 (0.0000)* 
Corruption 0.044308 (0.0549)*** 0.037836 (0.0871)*** 
GDP per cap $ 2.35E-06 (0.4103) 4.48E-06 (0.1754) 
Jobless Households -0.026437 (0.0000)* -0.023085 (0.0002)* 
Inflation -0.011343 (0.0159)** -0.010745 (0.0881)*** 
Urban -0.000615 (0.9391) 0.012889 (0.0009)* 
Public Budget before 2010 0.008114 (0.0236)** 0.009336 (0.0514)*** 
Public budget after 2010 -0.009029 (0.1176) -0.010001 (0.0965)*** 
Median population 0.041264 (0.0054)*  
Long term recession -0.046281 (0.0005)* 
 
-0.056090 (0.0000)* 
South Border -0.119499 (0.0764)*** -0.133594 (0.0657)*** 
Public health expenditure  0.044565 (0.0099)* 
School secondary enrolment  0.002657 (0.0000)* 
R2 0.824246 0.821165 
Durbin Watson 1.93 1.95 
Observations 294 266 
Notes: The signs *,**,*** indicate a level of statistical importance 1%,5% and 10% respectively. Coefficients’ p-values are given in parentheses. 









Appendix A: Variables’ Definitions and Sources. 
Variables Definition Source 
Age 0-19 Proportion of population aged 0-19 years Eurostat 
At poverty threshold At risk of poverty rate (cut-off point: 60% of median equivalised income after social transfers). Eurostat 
At poverty risk People at risk of poverty or social exclusion by age and sex. Eurostat 
Public Budget The general government deficit/surplus is defined in the Maastricht Treaty as general government net borrowing/lending 
according to the European System of Accounts (ESA95). It is the difference between the revenue and the expenditure of the 
general government sector. The government deficit data related to the EDP (EDP B.9) differs from the deficit according 
ESA95 (B.9) for the treatment of interest relating to swaps and forward rate agreements. The general government sector 
comprises the sub-sectors of central government, state government, local government and social security funds. The series 
are presented as a percentage of GDP and in millions of euro. GDP used as a denominator is the gross domestic product at 
current market prices. 
Eurostat 
Long Term Unmployment Long-term unemployment (12 months or more) as a percentage of the total unemployment(%) (Age 15-64 years) Eurostat 
Median population Median age of population Eurostat 
Population in jobless 
households  
People aged 18-59 living in jobless households: share of persons aged 18-59 who are living in households where no-one 
works 
Eurostat 
Variables Definition Source 
Public Debt The indicator is defined (in the Maastricht Treaty) as consolidated general government gross debt at nominal value, 
outstanding at the end of the year in the following categories of government liabilities (as defined in ESA95): currency and 
deposits, securities other than shares excluding financial derivatives, and loans. General government sector comprises the 
subsectors: central government, state government, local government and social security funds. Basic data are expressed in 
national currency, converted into euro using end-year exchange rates for the euro provided by the European Central Bank 
(ECB). 
Eurostat 
Youth Unemployment Unemployment rates represent unemployed persons as a percentage of the labour force. The labour force is the total number 
of people employed and unemployed. Unemployed persons comprise persons aged 15 to 74 who were: a. without work 
during the reference week, b. currently available for work, i.e. were available for paid employment or self-employment 
before the end of the two weeks following the reference week, c. actively seeking work, i.e. had taken specific steps in the 
four weeks period ending with the reference week to seek paid employment or self-employment or who found a job to start 
later, i.e. within a period of, at most, three months. 
Eurostat 
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Variables Definition Source 
Unemployment Unemployment rates by sex, age and nationality (age 15-64) Eurostat 
Gini The Gini coefficient is defined as the relationship of cumulative shares of the population arranged according to the level of 
equivalised disposable income, to the cumulative share of the equivalised total disposable income received by them. 
Eurostat 
Inflation Inflation, average consumer prices (Percent change). Annual percentages of average consumer prices are year-on-year 
changes. 
IMF 
GDP Growth constant Annual percentages of constant price GDP are year-on-year changes; the base year is country-specific . Expenditure-based 
GDP is total final expenditures at purchasers’ prices (including the f.o.b. value of exports of goods and services), less the 
f.o.b. value of imports of goods and services. [SNA 1993] 
IMF 
Variables Definition Source 
Polity2 Revised Combined Polity Score: This variable is a modified version of the POLITY  variable added in order to facilitate the 
use of the POLITY regime measure in time-series analyses. It modifies the combined annual POLITY score by applying a 
simple treatment, or ““fix,” to convert instances of “standardized authority scores” (i.e., -66, -77, and -88) to conventional 
polity scores (i.e., within the range, -10 to +10). 
POLITY IV 
PROJECT 
Regime Durability The number of years since the most recent regime change (defined by a threepoint change in the POLITY score over a 
period of three years or less) or the end of transition period defined by the lack of stable political institutions (denoted by a 
standardized authority score). 
POLITY IV 
PROJECT 
Political Competition The Polity dataset measures two dimensions of political competition: (1) the degree of institutionalization, or regulation, of 
political competition and (2) the extent of government restriction on political competition. 
POLITY IV 
PROJECT 
Democracy Institutionalized Democracy: Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements. One is the presence of 
institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. 
Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of 
civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. Other aspects of plural democracy, such 
as the rule of law, systems of checks and balances, freedom of the press, and so on are means to, or specific manifestations 
of, these general principles. We do not include coded data on civil liberties.The Democracy indicator is an additive eleven-





Gross enrolment ratio. Secondary. All programmes. Total is the total enrollment in secondary education, regardless of age, 
expressed as a percentage of the population of official secondary education age. GER can exceed 100% due to the inclusion 
of over-aged and under-aged students because of early or late school entrance and grade repetition. 
The World Bank 
Politcal Stability Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (PV) – capturing perceptions of the likelihood that the government 
will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically‐motivated violence and 
terrorism. 
The World Bank 
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Variables Definition Source 
Urban Urban population refers to people living in urban areas as defined by national statistical offices. It is calculated using World 
Bank population estimates and urban ratios from the United Nations World Urbanization Prospects. 
The World Bank 
Public health expentiture Health expenditure, public (% of total health expenditure) Public health expenditure consists of recurrent and capital 
spending from government (central and local) budgets, external borrowings and grants (including donations from 
international agencies and nongovernmental organizations), and social (or compulsory) health insurance funds. Total health 
expenditure is the sum of public and private health expenditure. It covers the provision of health services (preventive and 
curative), family planning activities, nutrition activities, and emergency aid designated for health but does not include 
provision of water and sanitation. 
The World Bank 
GDP per capita (current 
US$) 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all 
resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. 
It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural 
resources. Data are in current U.S. dollars. 
The World Bank 
Corruption Perceptions 
Index  
The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries/territories based on how corrupt a country’s public sector is perceived to 
be. It is a composite index, drawing on corruption-related data from expert and business surveys carried out by a variety of 
independent and reputable institutions. The Corruption Perceptions Index ranges between 0 (highly corrupt) and 10 (very 
clean) for the years 1995 - 2011 and between 0 - 100 afterwards, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt 
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Appendix B: Fractionalization’s influence on the political stability 
Among the other variables we examine in our study are the ethnic, religion and language discrimination. Like Blanco and Grier (2009) we use the 
fractionalization indexes from Alesina et al (2003). These data are stable in our sample’s period, therefore we cannot use them in our models, because we use the 
fixed effects approach. However, this could be an interesting (in our opinion) view of the fractionalisation’s influence of the political environment. Therefore, we 
choose to present it in this Appendix section. We employ the alternative to the fixed effects panel data models (random effects and pooled effects) which enable 
us to include the specific dataset in our modelxvi.  
The ethnological, religious and language fractionalization indexes show that the more fractonalised a country is, the more political instability (Random I, II and 
III models, respectively). From the models I,II and III the only variable that is statistically slightly not significant is the language fractionalization, because in 
most of the EU’s countries people speak not only their mother tongues, therefore the language fractonalisation may not be a reason that crucially could threaten 
the political stability. In contrast ethnic and religious differences significantly influence the political environment. These results are similar to those mentioned in 
previous empirical studies (Annet, 2001; Blanco and Grier, 2009 etc.). Even if we use the pooled regression model the results are similar. These results are 
available upon request.  
Finally, we may observe that the results in the rest of the variables we include in the following models are similar to the previous results of models 1-5. This may 








                                                             
xviThe fractionalisation dataset is available on http://www.nsd.uib.no/macrodataguide/set.html?id=16&sub=1  




Random effects panel data including the fractionalization ratios in the analysis. 
Variables Random I Random II Random III 
constant -0.135105 (0.0623)*** -0.081784 (0.3212) -0.166994 (0.0275)** 
Corruption 0.028793 (0.0997)*** 0.038999 (0.0151)** 0.035585 (0.0197)** 
GDP per cap $ 4.60E-06 (0.0737)*** 2.83E-06 (0.0810)* 4.96E-06 (0.0584)*** 
Jobless Households -0.022139 (0.0173)** 
-0.025794 (0.0069)* -0.023151 (0.0073)* 
Inflation -0.012148 (0.0003)* -0.012677 (0.0002)* -0.012576 (0.0003)* 
Urban 0.000462 (0.8891) -0.000105 (0.9747) 0.000390 (0.9103) 
Public Budget before 2010 0.010937 (0.0128)** 0.010563 (0.0155)** 0.010748 (0.0094)* 
Public budget after 2010 -0.007634 (0.0011)* -0.007962 (0.0000)* -0.007913 (0.0002)* 
Median population 0.034625 (0.0000)* 0.035225 (0.0000)* 0.033805 (0.0001)* 
Long term recession -0.025334 (0.1000)*** -0.028866 (0.0560)*** -0.025576 (0.0887)*** 
South Europe -0.140161 (0.0058)* -0.141035 (0.0079)* -0.121989 (0.0080)* 
Ethnic fractionalisation -0.240672 (0.0069)*   
Religion fractionalization  -0.248147 (0.0290)**  
Language fractionalisation   -0.124140 (0.1157) 
R2 0.583995 0.587164 0.578622 
Durbin Watson 1.944510 1.904824 1.917952 
Observations 294 294 294 
Notes:The signs *,**,*** indicate a level of statistical importance 1%,5% and 10% respectively. Coefficients’ p-values are given in parentheses. 
Random effects (white-cross section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected). 
 
